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Abstract
Over the last few years, there has been an almost exponential increase in the number of mobile
applications that deal with sensitive data, such as applications for e-commerce or health. When dealing
with sensitive data, classical authentication solutions based on username-password pairs are not enough,
and multi-factor authentication solutions that combine two or more authentication factors of different
categories are required instead. Even if several solutions are currently used, their security analyses
have been performed informally or semi-formally at best, and without a reference model and a precise
definition of the multi-factor authentication property. This makes a comparison among the different
solutions both complex and potentially misleading. In this paper, we first present the design of two
reference models for native applications based on the requirements of two real-world use-case scenarios.
Common features between them are the use of one-time password approaches and the support of a single
sign-on experience. Then, we provide a formal specification of our threat model and the security goals,
and discuss the automated security analysis that we performed. Our formal analysis validates the security
goals of the two reference models we propose and provides an important building block for the formal
analysis of different multi-factor authentication solutions.
1 Introduction
Context and Motivations. Over the last few years, there has been an almost exponential increase of the
number of native mobile applications (or apps, for short) that deal with sensitive data, ranging from apps
for e-commerce, banking and finance to apps for well-being and health. One of the main reasons behind
such a success is that mobile apps considerably increase the portability and efficiency of online services.
Banking apps allow users not only to check their account balances but also to move money and pay bills
or friends [11]. Mobile health apps range from personal health records (PHR) to personal digital assistants
using connected devices such as smartwatches and other body-worn devices or implants. There are nowadays
more than 325,000 mobile health apps (of which 158,000 are Android apps) on the market, a number that
is increasing on a weekly basis [45].
However, also the reports on security and privacy issues in mobile apps are increasing on a weekly basis,
bearing concrete witness to the fact that the management of sensitive data is often not properly taken into
account by the developers of the apps. For example, the studies performed by He et al. [25] on free mobile
health apps available on the Google Play store show that the majority of these apps send sensitive data in
clear text and store them on third party servers that do not support the required confidentiality measures.
When dealing with sensitive data, classical authentication solutions based on username-password pairs
are not enough. The “General Data Protection Regulation” of the European Union [16] mandates that
specific security measures must be implemented, including Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), a strong(er)
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authentication solution that combines two or more authentication factors of different categories (e.g., a
password combined with a PIN sent to a mobile device, or some biometric data). There are many alterna-
tive solutions on the market for providing MFA, usually based on One-Time Passwords (OTPs), which are
passwords that are valid for a short time and can only be used once. Examples are FIDO (Fast IDentity
Online, https://fidoalliance.org), which enables mobile devices to act as Universal 2nd Factor authentica-
tion devices over Bluetooth or NFC, and Mobile Connect (https://mobileconnect.io), which identifies users
through their mobile phone numbers.
In addition to the establishment of high-level security for authentication solutions for mobile apps, it is
essential to take the usability aspect into consideration. Monitoring apps often require a daily or even hourly
use, but understandably users cannot be bothered by a long and complex authentication procedure each
time they want to read or update their data, especially on mobile devices where the keyboard is small and
sometimes uncomfortable to use. A better usability can be provided by supporting a Single Sign-On (SSO)
experience, which allows users to access different, federated apps by performing a single login, carried out
with a selected identity provider (e.g., Facebook or Google). While the authenticated session is valid, users
can directly access all the apps in the federation, without having to enter their credentials again and again.
Contributions. In this paper, we focus on MFA solutions for Android1 apps based on OTPs and the
support of a federated SSO experience.
Many alternative MFA solutions are available on the market. For instance, Google Authenticator is a
mobile app that generates OTPs [23]. Like Google Authenticator, many of the OTP-generation solutions
on the market are applicable only to web solutions and use mobile devices as an additional factor. In the
scenario considered in this paper, users are not accessing web apps on their laptop or desktop, instead
they are accessing native mobile apps. Even if there are some solutions currently used, to the best of our
knowledge, their security analyses have been performed informally or semi-formally at best, and without a
precise definition of the MFA property that they are supposed to satisfy. This makes a comparison between
the different solutions both complex and potentially misleading. The main difficulty is probably the unclear
and subtle detection of which compromised authentication factors lead to breaking the protocol security.
As a first significant step to overcome these problems, we make four main contributions:
1. We have designed two MFA reference models2 for native apps based on the requirements of two real-
world use-case scenarios, namely the use of a native app as OTP generator and the use of SAML 2.0
as authentication protocols. The common features between these two MFA reference models are the
use of OTP approaches and the support of a SSO experience.
2. We have formulated a description of the proposed reference models detailing the security and trust
assumptions given by different implementation choices.
3. We have introduced the concept of instance factors, that lets us formally define the threat model
(specifying how and which instance factors are explicitly compromised) and the security property that
a MFA solution must guarantee.
4. We have performed a two-level security analysis. First, we have identified the instance factors that
are explicitly compromised (e.g., by stealing an ownership factor) by the different capabilities of an
attacker. More complex attack traces, where the attacker implicitly compromises other instance factors
exploiting some vulnerabilities of the protocol (e.g., by convincing users to finalize, using their own
factors, an authentication started on the attacker’s device) cannot be easily detected. Hence, in the
second level, we have formally analyzed our reference models by modeling the flow, assumptions,
attackers and goals using a formal language (ASLan++) and model-checking the security goal with
the SATMC tool.
1We focus on Android for practical reasons, but our approach can be similarly applied to other operating systems such as
iOS.
2A reference model is an abstract, semi-formal, representation of an authentication flow.
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Even if authentication and authorization are strictly related, the authorization aspect is out of the scope
of this paper. We decided to analyze MFA in the context of federated SSO login as a requirement given by
our use-case scenarios. However, it is important to note that by doing so, we do not lose generality given
that federated authentication systems are widespread scenarios. Moreover, since federated authentication
is more complex than authentication on individual domains, our analysis could quite straightforwardly be
customized to support MFA in that simplified context.
Our work is based on [47], where we have presented a MFA solution relying on the use of the Time-based
OTP (TOTP) generation approach [28] and formally analyzed the proposed reference model in the context
of a real-world scenario involving mobile e-health apps. In this paper, we extend [47] along the following
lines:
1. We have generalized the description of the solution analyzed in [47] and provided the design of an
additional reference model based on the use of the Challenge-Response (CR) approach [27] and a
hardware token. This reference model is based on the requirements given by a real-world scenario
involving the Italian national electronic identity card, which complies with the European standard of
electronic identity documents.
2. We have refined the formalization of a MFA solution: instead of identifying a set of strong and weak
assumptions as done in [47] to characterize the role of multi factors in the authentication process, we
evaluate the effectiveness of MFA solutions against a set of attackers with different capabilities. This
makes the result of the analysis more understandable and concrete.
3. We have provided the description and formalization of a set of proximity and hacker attackers in terms
of the operations that they can perform (e.g., get to know a PIN value or steal the user smartphone)
and which factors are compromised.
4. We have formally analyzed the two reference models based on the new formalization using the SATMC
tool.
It is worth to mention that, for concreteness, we have developed our ideas in the context of two real
use-case scenarios (mobile health apps and public administration online services). However, our reference
models are composed of a number of building-blocks that can be combined in different ways to support a
broader set of scenarios, and our threat models and formalization can be extended to analyze different MFA
solutions.
Organization. Section 2 provides background on strong authentication solutions and SSO for native mo-
bile apps, and on the formal specification language ASLan++ and the SATMC tool that we have employed.
Despite the generality of our study, for concreteness, we develop our ideas in the context of two real use-case
scenarios presented in Section 3. Having identified the scenario requirements, Section 4 describes the de-
sign of the proposed MFA reference models, identifies the corresponding security assumptions, discusses the
peculiarities of a MFA solution compared to a basic username-password authentication, and identifies the
corresponding threat model and security goals. The reference models are then formally specified (Section 5)
and analyzed using SATMC (Section 6). Section 7 discusses related work and Section 8 draws conclusions.
In Appendix A, we provide a glossary of abbreviations and notations used in the paper that the reader might
find useful.
2 Background
This section provides the basic notions required to understand our reference models and their security as-
sessment. In Section 2.1, we describe the roles involved in Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Single
Sign-On (SSO) solutions, discuss the different One-Time Password (OTP) generation approaches, and iden-
tify the functional requirements of a native SSO solution. In Section 2.2, we provide useful background for
our formal analysis.
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2.1 Multi-Factor Authentication and Native Single Sign-On
An authentication protocol determines the validity of one or more authentication factors used to claim a
digital identity of an entity. In our analysis, we will focus on MFA solutions that augment the security of
the basic username-password authentication by exploiting two or more authentication factors. In [15], it is
defined as:
“a procedure based on the use of two or more of the following elements — categorized as knowledge, own-
ership and inherence: i) something only the user knows, e.g., static password, code, personal identification
number; ii) something only the user possesses, e.g., token, smart card, mobile phone; iii) something the
user is, e.g., biometric characteristic, such as a fingerprint. In addition, the elements selected must be
mutually independent [. . .] at least one of the elements should be non-reusable and non-replicable”.
The more factors are used during the authentication process, the more confidence a service has that the user
is correctly authenticated.
The following are the roles usually involved in an authentication solution in the context of native mobile
apps:
• a User that wants to access a native Service Provider app (SPapp),
• an Identity Provider server (IdP) that manages the digital identities of the users and provides the
MFA process, and
• a User Agent (UA), which could be a browser or a native app used to perform the MFA process between
SPapp and IdP .
Optionally, the SPapp could have a backend server (SPS ).
In the case of MFA, the authentication process usually involves also physical devices or software for the
generation of additional identity proofs. We indicate with Token Provider (TP) the role that manages the
generation and validation of additional identity proofs; TP may have a server side (TPS ) and a client side
(TPapp). We indicate with Hardware Token (HWToken) a physical device used in combination with the user
smartphone (e.g., smartcard or USB keys).
There are many MFA solutions on the market. In this paper, we focus on a well-accepted solution that
combines a PIN code (“something only the user knows”) with the generation of an OTP using an OTP
generator (“something only the user possesses”). When an OTP-generation approach is used, a different
password is generated for each authentication request and is valid only once, providing a fresh authentication
property. Thus, compromising an old OTP does not have security consequences in the authentication process.
We can classify the many existing algorithms for generating OTPs into three main approaches:
• Time-based OTP (TOTP) [28]: a TOTP requires that the prover (TPapp) and verifier (TPS ) must
either share the same secret or the knowledge of a secret transformation to generate a shared secret. The
OTP is generated starting from the shared secret key (called seed) and the current time of the operation.
TPS must validate this value: only OTPs that fall into a short temporal range are accepted. TOTP
is an extension of the HMAC-based One-Time Password algorithm (HOTP) [26]. HOTP computes
the OTP using the seed plus a counter that is incremented every time an OTP is produced, whereas
TOTP computes the OTP using the seed plus the current time.
• Lamport’s algorithm [34]: the initial OTP is generated from a seed value and each successor OTP
value is based on the value of its predecessor. For example, if s is a seed value and F (x) is a one-way
function, the following OTPs are generated: o1 = s, o2 = F (o1 ), o3 = F (o2 ), . . . on = F (on−1 ). The
last OTP, on , is stored on TP . When a User wants to login, she sends on−1 to the server, and the
server applies the function F and checks that the result is equal to the stored value. If this is the case,
TP authenticates User and updates the stored value with on−1 . In the next login, User will use on−2
and so on. After n logins, User has to change the seed value and calculate new OTP values.
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• Challenge-Response (CR) [27]: in the execution of this approach, the verifier (TPS ) presents a challenge
(e.g., a pseudo-random number) and the prover (TPapp) answers with a valid response obtained by
performing an established operation (such as hashing the challenge with a secret, or applying a private
key operation). The response will be given to the verifier to check if it matches the expected value.
Since the challenge is usually a fresh value, the response can be considered as a special case of OTP. In
general, the use of a CR approach requires the interaction with an external HWToken (e.g., a smartcard
or a smartkey) where a private key is securely stored.
In Section 4, based on our use-case scenarios, we will detail the TOTP and CR approaches.
Native SSO protocols allow users to access multiple SPapp through a single authentication performed
with an IdP . As identified in [46], the two requirements that we expect for a native SSO solution are:
1. the IdP user credentials can be used to gain access to several SPapp — this implies that a User does
not need to have credentials with a SPapp to access it;
2. if a User has already an authenticated session with an IdP , then she can access a new SPapp without
re-entering her IdP credentials — only the consent of the User is required.
2.2 Formal Analysis: ASLan++ and SATMC
The use of formal languages and automatic tools for analyzing security protocols has allowed researchers
to uncover a large number of vulnerabilities in protocols that had been thought to be, or even informally
proved to be, secure. Famous examples range from protocols such as the Needham-Schroeder Public Key
protocol to Kerberos or TLS (see [10] for details). These examples underline how the design of a protocol
that requires specific security goals is not a simple task, as its security depends on several assumptions
on trust and communication channels (e.g., the federation between the involved parties, and the transport
protocol used in the message exchange). Several formal languages have been developed, all sharing the idea
to extract from the protocol message flow a description of the entities involved, the exchanged messages and
the channel assumptions. Formal protocol specifications are then given as input to automated tools (e.g.,
Tamarin [36] and ProVerif [12]) that check the desired security goals of the protocol against realistic threat
models.
In our analysis, given our expertise and past experience, we use ASLan++ [8, 53] and SATMC [4].
ASLan++, the input specification language of the AVANTSSAR Platform [3], is a high-level formal language
that formalizes the interactions between the different protocol roles, where a role represents a sequence of
operations (e.g., sending and receiving messages) that must be executed by the entity that plays that role.
ASLan++ supports the specification of different channel assumptions and security goals, most notably
different variants of authentication and confidentiality. SATMC, which is one of the model checkers of the
AVANTSSAR platform, uses state-of-the-art SAT solvers and allows for the specification of security goals
written using the Linear Temporal Logic.
3 Use-Case Description
Despite the generality of our research, for concreteness, we consider two real use-case scenarios:
1. TreC (Section 3.1), which involves mobile health (mHealth) apps and the use of a Time-based OTP
(TOTP) approach, and
2. DigiMat-Lab (Section 3.2), which involves the Italian electronic identity smartcard and a Challenge-
Response (CR) approach.
Both scenarios need the design of a MFA solution with a SSO experience for mobile native apps. As
we explained in Section 1, the use of current browser-based authentication protocols in the mobile context
requires a detailed understanding of the security issues as well as the design of a flow specific to mobile native
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Table 1: Requirements for the two real-world use-case scenarios.
Project Scenario Requirements
TreC mHealth 1) TOTP approach
2) Use of the existing mobile native app for supporting MFA and
SSO in the mobile context
DigiMat-Lab eID scheme 1) CR approach with the use of the Italian electronic identity card
(CIE 3.0)
2) Support of SAML as browser-based authentication protocol
apps. Some guidelines for supporting authentication and authorization in the mobile context were released
in 2017 by the OAuth working group, namely “OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps” [40]. Considering our scenarios,
the problem is that this specification does not mention how to extend the protocol to support MFA solutions
or other IdPs that support different authentication protocols.
Given these limitations, Section 4 describes the two reference models that we have designed based on
the requirements described in the following subsections, and summarized in Table 1, for the two real-world
use-case scenarios that we consider.
3.1 TreC: mHealth
TreC (an acronym in Italian for “Cartella Clinica del Cittadino”, i.e., “Citizens’ Clinical Record”) is a
platform developed in the Trentino region (in the north-east of Italy) for managing personal health records
(PHRs) [42]. Besides for the web platform3, which is routinely used by around 98,000 users, TreC has
been implementing a number of native Android apps to support self-management and remote monitoring of
chronic conditions. These apps are used in a “living lab” by voluntary chronic patients according to their
hospital physicians. Examples are:
• TreC Diario Diabete, a mobile diary that allows patients to record health data, such as the blood
glucose level and physical activity, and
• TreC FSE, a mobile native app that permits patients to consult their personal health data and medical
prescriptions from the smartphone.
To provide a MFA solution for the web scenario, TreC developers have released a mobile native app that
is used as an OTP generator: after the entering of a PIN value, the app shows an OTP on the screen of
the mobile device that is then copied by the user on the web page together with the credentials. To take
advantage of the presence of the application that users must download to authenticate themselves in the web
scenario, a requirement of the TreC scenario was to extend the existing application to support the native
SSO as well.
Fig. 1 shows two screenshots of the beta version of the TreC FSE app, which we plan to extend to support
SSO and MFA for the TreC app ecosystem.
3.2 DigiMat-Lab: the Italian Electronic Identity Card
DigiMat-Lab is a joint laboratory between FBK and IPZS, which is the Italian state printing office and mint.4
In the context of the laboratory, the FBK team have been involved in various activities, most notably in the
design of a mobile MFA mechanism that uses the Italian electronic identity card (CIE 3.0 – Carta d’Identita`
Elettronica) [37] as an OTP generator. CIE 3.0 is a personal identification document that will replace the
3https://trec.trentinosalute.net/
4The acronym IPZS stands for “Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato”. More information is available at https://www.
ipzs.it/.
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Figure 1: Screenshots of the TreC App.
paper-based identity card in Italy and is used for both online and offline identification. The microprocessor
of CIE 3.0 is contactless and can be read using a smartphone with a NFC (Near Field Communication)
interface.
We have derived two requirements for the DigiMat-Lab scenario. The choice of the OTP approach is
based on the CIE 3.0 characteristics. This card carries a private key and a X.509 certificate issued by
the Certification Authority of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs with the corresponding public key.
Encryption, decryption and signature with this certificate are the basic functionalities of this card, which is
therefore suitable for a CR OTP approach (cf. Section 2.1). The UA and protocol choice is based on the
identity provider characteristics. In Italy, to be in line with the majority of identity providers of the public
administration, we need a solution that supports SAML SSO [39], which is a widely-used browser-based
authentication protocol.
Fig. 2 shows two screenshots of the CieID mobile app that was developed to manage authentication by
interacting with the CIE 3.0. The current solution on the market, which has been certified with eIDAS [17],
supports only mobile web applications. The presented reference model is an extension of it to support mobile
native applications.
4 Description of our Reference Models
In this section, we present the two mobile MFA and SSO reference models that we have derived from the
use-case scenarios described in Section 3: RMTOTP and RMCR, where a reference model is an abstract
(semi-formal) representation of an authentication flow. In both reference models, we focus on scenarios
where the server-side of the Identity Provider (IdP) and Token Provider (TPS ) are played by the same
entity that we called IdTP . The entity-role mappings between the roles of an Identity Management (IdM )
system (cf. Section 2.1) and the entities of our reference models are summarized in Table 2 (our reference
models can be used in different scenarios, thus we do not specify a specific service provider app SPapp). In
detail:
RMTOTP . We have designed this reference model starting from the TreC use-case requirements. The OTP
generator app is released by IdTP and plays both the role of the User Agent (UA) and the Token
7
Figure 2: Screenshots of the CieID App.
Provider client-side (TPapp). Abstracting from the TreC scenario, we call this app IDOTP (see Ta-
ble 2).
To design this reference model, as described in [46], we have first performed a rational reconstruction
of the native SSO used in Facebook (FB) [18]. To obtain a precise description of the FB native SSO
flow, we have used the following methodology: we have analyzed the source code of the FB SDK to
understand the interaction between a client app and the FB client application inside the smartphone,
and we have used the Fiddler proxy tool5 to carefully inspect the HTTP(S) traffic between the FB
client and the FB server. We have derived a reference model with a native app as UA that generalizes
the one proposed by FB in such a way that it can be used as a reference model by any IdP willing to
provide its own IdM solution. In [46], we also made a comparison between the derived reference model
and OAuth for native apps [40]. In this work, compared to the reference model proposed in [46], we
have enhanced the security by adding the generation, exchange and validation of Time-based OTPs
(TOTPs). The MFA based on TOTP protects mainly against a stolen smartphone. Indeed, even if the
user’s smartphone is stolen, the attacker cannot login as the victim without generating the expected
OTP. We have designed this reference model by taking into account a security-by-design paradigm
(i.e., the solution has been designed from the first steps to be secure) and usability aspects (i.e., we
have followed a human-centered design approach that has the goal of making usable solutions, having
in mind the user’s needs and requirements); our goal was to propose a solution that guarantees a high
level of security while maximizing usability. For example, RMTOTP does not require users to digit
(long) OTP strings as they are directly communicated by IDOTP (the TOTP generator app) to the
IdTP . This obviously improves the user experience, and prevents the theft of OTP values from the
clipboard [19], which could be used by User to copy the OTP value if manually entered.
RMCR. We have designed this reference model starting from the DigiMat-Lab use-case requirements. As
SAML 2.0 was not designed taking into account the mobile scenario, we have extracted from the OAuth
for native apps [40] all the security features that can be adopted in SAML. Like in [40], our reference
model requires the use of an external user agent and does not save client’s secret on the app. The main
difference is the flow choice. In [40] the suggested flow is Authorization Code flow with PKCE [30].
In our reference model, since the OAuth flow is incompatible with SAML IdPs, we had to adapt the
5Available at http://fiddler2.com/.
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Table 2: Mapping our Reference Model Entities and IdM Roles.
IdM Role RMTOTP RMCR
User Agent ( UA) IDOTP Browser
Service Provider app ( SPapp) SPapp SPapp
Token Provider app ( TPapp) IDOTP OTPApp
Identity Provider ( IdP) and Token Provider ( TPS ) IdTP IdTP
Hardware Token ( HWToken) - eIDCard
suggested flow.6 To mitigate token interception attacks, thus guaranteeing similar security properties
of PKCE, we require the use of App Link as a redirection method (instead, it is optional in [40]).
Hence, we have generalized [40] by providing a reference model that can be used by SAML-based
IdP and for supporting a MFA based on the generation of OTPs with a CR approach. As explained
in Section 2, the use of a CR approach requires the interaction with an external Hardware Token
(HWToken), where a private key is stored securely. Focusing on the DigiMat-Lab project, we describe
the reference model for electronic identity cards (eIDCard) protected by a PIN that interact with a
native app (called OTPApp) that plays the role of TPapp (see Table 2).
In general, we could consider different combinations of OTP generator approaches or scenarios where the
second-factor validation is performed by IdP and TPS belonging to different security domains (these changes
require extra design and we will consider them in future work; in any case, for certain combinations, we can
simply reuse our existing building-blocks).
Both RMTOTP and RMCR consist of three phases: registration, activation and exploitation, which we
describe in the following subsections. As the registration and activation phases are two preliminary phases,
and our focus is on the authentication property performed during the exploitation phase, we provide more
details for the exploitation by describing the reference model flow with a step-by-step description using
message sequence charts and detailing the required security assumptions.
4.1 Registration Phase of RMTOTP and RMCR
The registration phase is performed by the SPapp developers and corresponds to the exchange of some
information (called metadata) about SPapp with IdTP . The metadata required by IdTP can vary, but at
least the following two values must be always present (see Table 3):
RMTOTP . The app package name and the certificate fingerprint (called key hash) of the app must always
be present. The key hash is a digest (SHA1) of the file CERT.RSA, which contains the public key of
the developer, the signature of the app package calculated using the private key of the developer, and
other information about the certificate. key hash depends on the private key of the SPapp developer
and it is thus different for apps implemented by different developers. After the registration phase, the
IdTP associates an identifier with the registered SPapp .
RMCR. The app package name and the redirection URI (called redirect uri) of the app must always be
present. A redirect uri corresponds to the HTTPS scheme URI claimed by SPapp to manage the
redirection inside the smartphone. As explained in [40], “some platforms allow apps to claim an
HTTPS scheme URI after proving ownership of the domain name. URIs claimed in such a way are
then opened in the app instead of the browser.” In Android (6.0+)7 this mechanism is called App
Links [1] (whereas in iOS (9+) it is called Universal Links [32]). To register an HTTPS URI scheme
the developer has to perform the following steps: configure the app to support HTTPS URI scheme,
6If the IdP is OIDC compliant, then we suggest to refer to the current best practice [40, 31].
7For previous Android versions, the app-declared custom URI scheme can be used as an alternative redirection scheme. A
known limitation of this scheme is that the registration of a specific URI is not unique. See [40] for more details.
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and publish on the developer’s website a JSON file with the URLs that the app manages. This file is
used to provide domain verification.
The registration phase can be performed in different ways, e.g., entering the data into an online dashboard
or via an email exchange. Since a trust relationship between SPapp and IdTP is established as result of the
registration phase, it is important that IdTP validates the SPapp data; in some cases (e.g., when user personal
or sensitive data are involved) a service-level agreement could be required as well.
4.2 Activation Phase of RMTOTP and RMCR
The activation phase is performed by the User to configure TPapp to support a second authentication factor
as well:
RMTOTP . As explained in Section 2, a TOTP algorithm requires that “the prover and verifier must either
share the same secret or the knowledge of a secret transformation to generate a shared secret” [28],
without specifying when and how to exchange this secret. For RMTOTP , IDOTP obtains from IdTP
the seed value (i.e., a shared secret between IDOTP and IdTP used, combined with the time, to
generate new OTP values) as part of the activation phase, and then stores it encrypted with the
PIN code selected by the User during this phase (we indicate this with {|seed |} PIN , where the
notation {|M |} K means that a message M is encrypted with a symmetric key K).8 In addition, as a
consequence of the activation, IDOTP obtains from IdTP a token called token IdP (used as a session
token in place of the user credentials to provide a SSO experience).
RMCR. As a consequence of the activation, OTPApp asks User to digit the PIN code of her eIDCard (a
value known to User) and to put in contact the eIDCard with her smartphone. In the interaction
between the eIDCard and OTPApp the PIN value is checked. At the end of this step, OTPApp stores
internally the second part of the PIN code (called PIN2 ). We have decided to store the second part
of the PIN code and the User will be required to insert only the remaining four digits from here on
for both usability (usually an eIDCard PIN is composed of 8-digits) and security (PIN2 becomes an
additional ownership factor that an attacker has to compromise) reasons.
Since in our analysis we will focus on the authentication property, we assume that the registration and
activation phases have been already performed, without any interference of attackers. This is a common
practice [33, 44] when dealing with authentication protocols consisting of a preliminary phase in which
specific values are stored to set the protocol up. Indeed, since a trust relationship between SPapp and IdTP
is established as a result of the registration phase, it is important that IdTP validates the SPapp data; if
the activation phase is compromised (e.g., by a phishing app activated in place of the valid one), then no
security guarantees can be achieved during the authentication as the attacker is able to generate valid OTPs
and use them during the exploitation phase.
Table 3 summarizes the values stored by the involved entities as a result of the registration and activation
phase. These values represent the initial knowledge of the entities before the execution phase and are shown
in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 inside gray boxes.
4.3 Exploitation Phase of RMTOTP and RMCR
The exploitation phase is performed every time the User accesses a SPapp . The steps for RMTOTP are shown
in Fig. 3 and consist of:
S1. User opens SPapp .
S2. SPapp sends a request to SPS including a session token token sync.
8As a common assumption is to consider cryptography to be unbreakable, we are simply modeling the seed stored encrypted
with the PIN. In a real implementation, to avoid brute force attacks, the seed should be encrypted with a longer key derived
from the PIN value or the server should set a limit on the wrong login requests (i.e., requests with a not valid OTP value).
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Table 3: Registration and Activation Phases.
Action RMTOTP RMCR
Registration Phase Exchange of SP metadata package name, package name,
key hash redirect uri
Activation Phase Values stored in UA for SSO token IdP -
Values stored in TPapp {|seed |} PIN PIN2
User knowledge PIN PIN1
S3. SPS checks the validity of token sync. If token sync has expired, then SPS sends an error message
asking for a login to SPapp , otherwise Step S7 is executed.
A1. User clicks the login button.
A2. SPapp sends a token request to IDOTP passing as parameter its identifier.
A3-A4. IDOTP reads the key hash value of SPapp , and sends a token request to IdTP including this value.
key hash is used by IdTP to validate the SPapp identity.
A5. If SPapp is valid, then IdTP returns to IDOTP a consent containing the meta-data of SPapp .
A6. IDOTP asks User the PIN value showing the SPapp information.
A7. If User agrees to the operation shown by IDOTP , then User enters the PIN value.
A8-A9. IDOTP generates an OTP as a function of the seed (extracted using the PIN as decryption key)
and of time, and sends it to IdTP together with SPapp , the key hash value and token IdP , which
corresponds to the user credentials entered during the activation phase.
A10. If the OTP value is valid, then IdTP returns a token token SP={IdTP ,User ,SPapp}K−1IdTP to IDOTP .
token SP contains the identity of IdTP , User and SPapp , and is digitally signed with K
−1
IdTP , the private
key of IdTP . In general, the notation {M}K−1A means that the message M is digitally signed by A
using its private key K−1A .
A11. IDOTP returns token SP to SPapp as result of Step A2.
S4. SPapp sends a token request to SPS including token SP.
S5. SPS checks the validity of token SP. To perform this validation, SPS should check that token SP: (i)
is not expired or is received within a limited amount of time (e.g., 5 minutes from the token request);
(ii) contains the right SPapp identifier; and (iii) is released by the right IdTP (by checking the token
signature and IdTP identifier). If token SP is valid, then SPS creates and sends to SPapp a token
token sync. This token will be used by SPapp to synchronize user data in future interactions, until its
expiration.
S6. When SPapp needs to synchronize data, SPapp sends a request to SPS including token sync.
S7. SPS checks token sync and, if token sync is valid, then SPS sends the requested resource to SPapp .
We have labeled the steps with “S” and “A”. The S steps are related to the SP (but note that our
representation is only an example and each SP could support different solutions). The A steps represent the
steps related to authentication. As the S steps can vary depending on the choices of the SP developers, in
our analysis, we will focus on the A steps.
The A steps for RMCR are shown in Fig. 4:
11
Notation:	Operation	(relevant	parameters)
																or	simply
																	relevant	parameters
:SP
app
:IDOTP
A3.	Read	key_hash	of		SPapp
:IdTP
A10.		     _  
User
User	action https inter-app	communication
A1.	Click	Login	
(Request) A2.	Token	request	(SPapp)
A11.	     _  
A4.		key_hash
:SP
S
S1.	Open	app S2.	Resource	request	(token_sync)
S3.	Login	Form
S6.	Resource	request	(token_sync)
S7.	resource
S4.	Token	sync	request	(     _  )
S5.	token_sync
A5.		Consent	Form	(SP	metadata)
					A6.	PIN	request	(SP	metadata)
A8.TOTP	generation
A9.	OTP,	SPapp,	key_hash,	token_IdP
A7.	PIN
{|seed|}_PIN,	
token_IdP
seed,	token_IdP,
key_hash,	
SP	metadataPIN token_sync
K-1IdTP
token_sync	expired
	IdTP	builds	an	authentication	assertion
	={IdTP,	User,	SPapp}      _  
Figure 3: RMTOTP Flow.
A1. User clicks the login button.
A2. SPapp opens Browser with a token request to IdTP passing as parameter its identifier.
A3. Browser follows the link redirection and sends the token request to IdTP .
A4-A5. IdTP returns a challenge to OTPApp, passing through Browser , where a cookie (called session cookie)
is set.
A6-A8. OTPApp asks User to digit the first part of her PIN (called PIN1 ) specifying the operation (in this
case the login with SPapp) and to place her eIDCard close the her smartphone.
A9. OTPApp combines the two parts PIN1 (value just typed) and PIN2 (value stored during the activation
phase) of the PIN, and starts the communication with the eIDCard via NFC sending the combined
PIN and the challenge.
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Figure 4: RMCR Flow.
A10. After checking the PIN value, eIDCard signs the challenge using the private key stored inside the chip
and sends the generated response together with the user X.509 certificate (called CertU ) to OTPApp.
A11-A12. OTPApp sends, through Browser , the response value and CertU to IdTP . In Step A12, Browser
adds the corresponding session cookie.
A13. If the response is valid, then IdTP returns to Browser a token token SP that contains the identity of
User , IdTP and SPapp , and is digitally signed with K
−1
IdTP , the private key of IdTP .
A14. Browser redirects token SP to SPapp following its redirect uri (value stored by IdTP during the SPapp
registration phase).
The challenge value can be selected by the IdTP . In our analysis, we consider the following concatenation
of messages: challenge = OpID .SPapp .IdTP , where OpID is the identifier of the authentication request.
4.4 Security Assumptions
Our reference models are based on a number of security assumptions (sa) divided in:
• Trust Assumptions, which clarify the trust relationships between the different entities,
• Communication Assumptions, which specify the concrete implementation of the communication chan-
nels required in our reference models, and
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• Activation Assumption, which identifies the assumptions related to the activation phase.
We use a subscript (TOTP or CR) to specify when the assumption is specific for a reference model.
When the subscript is not specified, the assumption holds for both the reference models.
4.4.1 Trust Assumptions.
For both RMTOTP and RMCR, we have identified the following trust assumption:
(TA1) IdTP is trusted by SPapp on identity assertions, i.e., IdTP releases only valid identity assertions.
In addition, for RMCR we have:
(TA2CR) Browser is trusted by User and IdTP on receiving OTP values and identity assertions.
4.4.2 Communication Assumptions.
For RMTOTP , communications between the entities are subject to the following assumptions:
(CA1TOTP ) The communication between SPapp and IDOTP is carried over an inter-app communication
implemented using StartActivityForResult(). This Android method allows an app to execute
another app and get a result back, and thus guarantees that the SPapp that sends a request to IDOTP
at Step A2 in Fig. 3 is the same app that receives the result back from IDOTP at Step A11.
(CA2TOTP ) To read the key hash value (Step A3 of Fig. 3), IDOTP uses the Android method
getPackageInfo(packageName, PackageManager.GET SIGNATURES), which extracts the information
about the certificate fingerprint included in the package of SPapp .
(CA3TOTP ) The communication between IDOTP and IdTP occurs over a unilateral TLS channel, estab-
lished through the exchange of a valid certificate (from IdTP to IDOTP).
For RMCR, communications between the parties are subject to the following assumptions:
(CA1CR) To exchange token SP with SPapp (Step A14 of Fig. 4), Browser uses Android App Links. This
redirection scheme guarantees that Browser sends token SP to the correct SPapp (previously validated
by the operating system as explained in Section 4.1).
(CA2CR) The communication between Browser and IdTP occurs over a unilateral TLS channel, established
through the exchange of a valid certificate (from IdTP to Browser).
(CA3CR) OTPApp launches an external Browser . To increase usability, we suggest to use the Chrome
Custom Tabs (“a programmatic instantiation of the browser that is displayed inside a host app, but
retains the full security properties and authentication state of the browser” [40]).
(CA4CR) The communication between eIDCard and OTPApp occurs over a unilateral secure channel, es-
tablished through the exchange of a valid certificate from eIDCard to OTPApp.
In order to show that these assumptions are reasonable, they refer to a concrete implementation of the
communication channels. However, our analysis is general and in Section 5.3 we will provide the formal
counterpart abstracting away the implementation details. By doing so, any implementation satisfying the
abstract assumptions can be used in place of the implementation mentioned above (e.g., considering a similar
solution in the case of iOS), and the results of our security analysis still hold.
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4.4.3 Activation Assumption.
Phishing attacks (in this context, we mean a malicious app that creates a fake login form and steals the user’s
credentials) are one of the most common types of attack and usually are beyond the scope of an authentication
protocol. In our analysis, together with a secure communication, we assume that no phishing is possible
during the activation phase of RMTOTP and RMCR (while we will consider it during the exploitation phase
analysis):
(ActivA) The activation phase is correctly performed by User . That is, User downloads the correct IDOTP
or OTPApp (i.e., they are not fake apps) and correctly follows the activation phase, and the commu-
nication channels that are involved in this phase are secure.
4.5 Towards a Formal Specification of Multi-Factor Authentication
Let us now discuss the peculiarities of a MFA solution compared to a basic username-password authentication;
in doing so, we introduce some concepts that will be key for the formal analysis.
A MFA solution augments the security of the basic username-password authentication by exploiting two
or more authentication factors. Following the definition given in Section 2.1, we infer that RMTOTP and
RMCR are two-factor authentication solutions using knowledge and ownership elements (factors). As the
real-world scenarios that we have described in Section 3 do not involve inherence elements, we leave their
analysis as future work. To assess in a finer-grained way the security of solutions where different factors
belonging to the same category are used (e.g., a solution that requires a PIN and a password), we introduce
the notion of instance factors.
Given a protocol P , we call instance factor (IFP ) every specific instance of either an ownership factor
(IFactoro) or a knowledge factor (IFactork) involved in P .
As shown in Table 4, RMTOTP involves the following three instance factors:
• the IFactoro token IdP that is stored in IDOTP and in IdTP as a result of the activation phase (used
as a session token in place of the User credentials to provide a SSO experience),
• the IFactork PIN known by the User (used to protect the OTP generator), and
• the IFactoro {|seed |} PIN , a value stored in IDOTP and shared (without the PIN encryption) with
IdTP .
RMCR involves the following three instance factors:
• the IFactoro eIDCard that is owned by the User and contains her private key used to sign the challenge
request,
• the IFactork PIN1 that is known by the User and entered in OTPApp during the exploitation phase,
and
• the IFactoro PIN2 that is stored in OTPApp and that, combined with PIN1 , is used to protect the
eIDCard .9
Compared to the usual notion of authentication factors [15], instance factors can have a dependency. For
example, the two ownership instance factors of RMTOTP are both stored in IDOTP . Thus, by breaching
the IDOTP app both of them are compromised. However, it is important to note that in general different
mitigations can be implemented for the different instance factors, thus considering instance factors provides
a finer-grained security analysis. For example, in our reference model, if a User realizes that the IDOTP
has been compromised (e.g., if her smartphone has been stolen), she can invalidate token IdP , thus blocking
possible attacks.
9We consider PIN2 as an ownership factor as we assume that users are educated to digit the entire PIN only during the
activation phase, and thus users will never insert PIN2 anymore.
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Table 4: Instance Factors.
IFactork IFactoro
IFRMTOTP PIN token IdP , {|seed |} PIN
IFRMCR PIN1 eIDCard , PIN2
Table 5: Attackers of our Threat Model.
Attacker Name Description
Smartphone Device Thief (DT Æ) a proximity attacker who is able to steal the User ’s smartphone
eIDCard Device Thief (DT=) a proximity attacker who is able to steal the User ’s electronic
identity smartcard
Social Engineer (SE ) a hacker attacker capable of fooling or persuading the User into
handing over confidential or sensitive data (e.g., the user’s pass-
word or PIN), using for example a fake email
Shoulder Surfer (SS ) a proximity attacker who is able to read the data entered by the
User during the authentication
App Duplicator (AD) a proximity-hacker attacker who is able to clone the instance
factors stored in the smartphone
Eavesdropping Software (ES ) a malware inside the User ’s smartphone able to read the data
entered by the User (e.g., keylogger)
Malicious Application (MA) a malicious application inside the User ’s smartphone that is able
to interact with the User and perform phishing attacks
4.6 Threat Model
Based on our use-case scenarios (cf. Section 3) and in relation to the capabilities that an attacker can have
under the security assumptions of Section 4.4, we have identified a number of proximity and hacker attackers
(inspired by the NIST threat model in [24] and [49]), which we list in Table 5. We model these attackers
taking into account two aspects:
• specifying how instance factors can be explicitly compromised (operations performed), and
• detailing which instance factors are explicitly compromised by the attacker (set of instance factors).
4.6.1 Operations of Attackers.
As mentioned in Section 4.5, we have considered two kinds of instance factors: IFactoro, consisting of a
value stored by an entity (e.g., a seed value stored on an OTP generator app), and IFactork, which is a value
known by the User and entered into one or more entities (e.g., a PIN value entered into an OTP generator
app). Then, we can distinguish four kinds of operations that an attacker in our threat model can perform:
know(IFactork ): an attacker could know the IFactork value independently of the protocol run (e.g., by
persuading the User to reveal the PIN value).
own(IFactoro): an attacker could have the ability to extract IFactoro from an entity (e.g., by reading the
app data).
overhear(E ): an attacker could have the ability to overhear messages sent by User to the entity E .
interact(E ): an attacker could have the ability to interact with the entity E in place of an honest entity (e.g.,
the User). If the interaction of an entity with another is mutually exclusive, namely interactME (E ),
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Table 6: Attacker Operations and Compromised Instance Factors for RMTOTP and RMCR.
Attacker (a) Operation IFRMTOTP (a) IFRMCR (a)
DT Æ for all E in Æ. interactME (E ) {|seed |} PIN , token IdP PIN2
DT= interactME (=) - eIDCard
SE , SS for all IFactork entered by User .
know(IFactork )
PIN PIN1
AD for all E in Æ. own(IFactoro) {|seed |} PIN , token IdP PIN2
ES for all E in Æ. overhear(E ) PIN PIN1
MA for all E in Æ. overhear(E ), PIN PIN1
interact(=), - eIDCard
interact(E ), own(IFactoro) {|seed |} PIN , token IdP PIN2
either the User or the attacker can interact with E . We require the mutual exclusion in case of stealing
an entity (e.g., an attacker cannot ask the User to enter her PIN value into an app installed on a stolen
smartphone).
The first two operations correspond to an attacker who is directly compromising (knows or owns) IFactor
values. The last two operations correspond to an attacker who during the execution of the protocol intercepts
a value expected by E or interacts with E (i.e., an attacker who is compromising an entity).
Table 6 shows how the attackers of Table 5 are modeled using these four operations. In detail:
DT Æ The theft of the User ’s smartphone implies the capability to interact in a mutual exclusive way
with all the entities that store an IFactoro in the smartphone. Thus, we model this attack as
interactME (E ) for all E in Æ.
DT= To model the possession of a smartcard, we consider an attacker able to interact with it in a
mutual exclusive way. Thus, we model this attack as interactME (=).
SE , SS SE and SS are able to know the IFactork entered by User before the protocol run, thus we use
know(IFactork ) for all IFactork known by User and entered by the User during the authentication.
AD To model an AD attacker, which is a proximity hacker with the ability to extract data from the
device, we use own(IFactoro) for all E in Æ.
ES To model ES (e.g., a keylogger capable of reading all the data entered by the User), we use
overhear(E ) for all E in Æ.
MA It could be the case that both ownership and knowledge instance factors are compromised. Indeed,
if MA is a malicious app installed in the User ’s smartphone, then it can persuade the User to
enter the IFactork (modeled as overhear(E ) for all E in Æ), interact with the smartcard, thus
compromising an IFactoro (modeled as interact(=)), interact with all the entities that store an
IFactoro in the smartphone (modeled as interact(E ) for all E in Æ), and finally, with root privilege
permissions, it is able to read the internal state of another entity (modeled as own(IFactoro) for
all E in Æ).
In our analysis, we have considered the attackers that are the most significant to our study. However,
as remarked above, our approach is still applicable in case an analyst wishes to consider other attackers by
combining own(IFactoro), interact(E ), interactME (E ), know(IFactork ) and overhear(E ) in different ways.
4.6.2 Set of Explicitly Compromised Instance Factors.
Together with the specification of how instance factors are compromised (the operation performed), we
specify which instance factors are explicitly compromised by an attacker. Given an attacker a and a protocol
P , we refer to this set as the set of instance factors explicitly compromised by a in P and denote it by
writing IFP (a). Explicitly compromised means that for sure an attacker, given his capabilities, is able to
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compromise an instance factor. However, based on the protocol, an attacker could also have the possibility
to implicitly exploit other instance factors. For example, let us consider a MFA protocol based on passwords
and an out-of-band (OOB) software [24]. An attacker who is able to explicitly compromise a password (e.g.,
a shoulder surfer) can start a run of the protocol on his computer. Then, if the user accepts the notified
operation on his OOB software, the attack succeeds. In this case, an attacker is thus able to (implicitly)
compromise the OOB software.
The relations between the attacker operations and IFP (a) are straightforward. IFP (a) is the smallest
set such that:
• if know(IFactork ), then IFactork ∈ IFP (a);
• if own(IFactoro), then IFactoro ∈ IFP (a);
• if overhear(E ), then IFP (a) ⊇ {IFactork | IFactork ∈ E};
• if interact(E ) or interactME (E ), then IFP (a) ⊇ {IFactoro | IFactoro ∈ E}.
For example, if an attacker a can read all the information typed by User by performing overhear(E ),
and in P User has to enter into E her password and PIN , then IFP (a) = {password ,PIN }.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 show the set of instance factors associated with the aforementioned attackers
in our reference models, where E=IDOTP in RMTOTP and E=OTPApp or E=eIDCard in RMCR. This
definition can be easily extended to a set of attackers A as follows: IFP (A) =
⋃
ak∈A IFP (ak ).
4.7 Definition of Goals G and Gn
In the context of SSO, the expected security goal of a basic password-based authentication is:
(G) SP authenticates User through an IdP assertion.
For G to hold, User is required to prove the possession and control of an authentication factor: either
credentials (something only she knows) or a session token (e.g., a cookie stored in her browser) in order to
be properly identified by IdP and consequently by SP .
We are not aware of any formal definition of the security properties of a MFA solution apart from [6].
In [6], the authors analyzed a two-factor and two-channel authentication solution that combines a classical
single-factor solution with the exchange of a second factor using the GSM/3G/4G communication infras-
tructure of the user’s mobile phone. By generalizing the definition in [6] for any two-factor authentication
solution involving n instance factors, we have that, under the security assumptions and a set of threat-
model assumptions, a two-factor authentication solution involving n instance factors is expected to meet the
following security property:
(Gn) Goal G holds even if an attacker compromises up to n− 1 instance factors.
Thus, the addition of instance factors ensures some “redundancy”, meaning that if Gn holds there are no
attacks even if some (but not all the) instance factors are compromised.
Considering a single User authentication attempt for each protocol run (which is a reasonable assump-
tion), we want to evaluate whether the attackers of Table 5 are able to violate the Gn property. In partic-
ular, we are going to check if a protocol guarantee Gn , i.e., is a multi-factor authentication protocol, when
|IFP (A)| < n. To automatize the analysis, in Section 5 we provide a formalization of the attackers and the
protocol in ASLan++.
4.8 Definition of Goal GOTP
A main characteristic of our reference models is the use of OTPs. An OTP generator usually takes as input
a set of instance factors (say instance factors linked with OTP, IF OTPP ) and gives as output an OTP. As
discussed in Section 2, an OTP “should be non-reusable and non-replicable.” Indeed, if the OTP is not fresh,
then the knowledge of an OTP leads to the same attacks possible when knowing the instance factors linked
with it. Thus, it is crucial that the “non-reusable and non-replicable” property of the OTP is satisfied.
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(GOTP ) Goal G holds even if an attacker compromises all the instance factors apart from at least one linked
with OTP and obtains the OTP only after its use.
Thus, the use of an OTP ensures that IdTP accepts only one OTP for a specific operation avoiding replay
attacks.
For the channel assumptions that we have defined in Section 4.4, OTP values cannot be stolen (e.g., a
network attacker is not able to steal this value as a TLS channel is used). However, to assess the validity
of GOTP , we need to consider an attacker able of obtaining the OTP value. Thus, we consider an attacker,
called OTP Eavesdropping (OE ), who can indirectly10 compromise the set of instance factors linked with
the OTP. We will consider the possibility of performing this operation, called obtain(OTP), after the OTP
is used to authenticate User .
5 Formal Specification RMTOTP and RMCR
In this section, we describe how the semi-formal description of RMTOTP and RMCR can be translated into
a formal specification (in this case, specified in ASLan++), detailing the initial state, the behavior of the
entities, the channels, the security assumptions, the attackers and the security goals.
5.1 Initial State
The initial state of a formal specification defines the initial knowledge of the attacker, who is indicated with
the letter i (from the word “intruder”), and of all the honest entities that participate in the protocol run,
where a protocol run is a particular run of the protocol, played by specific entities, using specific instances of
the communication channels and, optionally, additional parameters that must be passed as initial knowledge
to the different entities.
For what concerns the registration phase, we have modeled the data provided by the SPapp developer
as initial knowledge of IdTP . In general, after the registration phase, IdTP creates a database storing the
relation between the SPapp identities, either their key hash values for RMTOTP or redirect uri for RMCR, and
the information (e.g., name and logo) provided by the SP developers. We have modeled the data obtained
as result of the activation phase (token IdP and data required for generating OTPs) as initial knowledge
of User , IDOTP and IdTP for RMTOTP and User , OTPApp and eIDCard for RMCR. In particular, for
RMTOTP , the activation phase entails: a User knows her PIN value (pinUser), IDOTP knows token IDP
and {|seed|} pinUser, and IdTP creates a DB (usersDB) with User , token IDP and seed as entry. In
RMCR, the activation phase entails: OTPApp knows the user PIN value of eIDCard and stores the second
part (pin2).
To specify that the attacker knows a message m, we use the ASLan++ predicate iknows(m).
5.2 Behavior of Entities and Channels
The behavior of the honest entities is specified by the evolution of the system, which consists of a sequence
of operations performed by each role. For simplicity, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the evolution of the protocol
using a process view, which describes the messages exchanged in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively, for each
entity as a set of actions (e.g., receive or send a message and DB access), where Actor is the keyword used
in ASLan++ to represent the entity taken into consideration. This formal representation can be translated
into various role-based formal languages and provided as input to different state-of-the-art security protocol
analyzers (e.g., Tamarin and ProVerif). In our analysis, given our expertise and past experience we use
ASLan++ and SATMC (see [8] for more details on the language and tool).
For a detailed definition of the properties of channels between two protocol entities A and B we point
the reader to [5, 38]. In a nutshell, consider a message m sent on a channel A2B from A to B. We write:
• authentic on(A2B,A), if B can rely on the fact that only A could have sent m,
10Indirectly means that the attacker does not actually know or possess an IFactor — thus he cannot generate new OTPs.
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Legend:
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IdTP2IdO!Metadata
IdO2IdT?otp_generation(Seed,	Time).SPapp.Keyhash.Token_IdP
Figure 5: Protocol View for RMTOTP .
• confidential to(A2B,B), if A can rely on the fact that only B can receive m,
• weakly authentic(A2B), if the channel input is exclusively accessible to a single, but yet unknown,
sender, and
• weakly confidential(A2B), if the channel output is exclusively accessible to a single, but yet un-
known, receiver.
A link property between two channels A2B and B2A (denoted link(A2B,B2A)) means that the entity
sending messages over A2B is the same entity that receives messages from B2A. These properties can be
represented graphically as follows (see Figures 3 and 4): A •→ B, A ◦→ B, A→• B, A→◦ B mean authentic,
weakly authentic, confidential and weakly confidential channel, respectively; moreover, we indicate a link
property between two channels with the same arrow style.
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Legend:
U,	B,	O,	eID	stands	for	User,	Browser,	OTPApp,	eIDCard	respectively,	and	U2SP,	B2SP,	B2IdTP,	SP2B,	IdTP2B,	O2eID,	eID2O,	O2B,
B2O,	U2O,	O2U,	U2eID	are	their	unidirectional	channels.
Ch!M	means	that	message	M	is	sent	over	channel	Ch.
Ch?M	means	that	message	M	is	received	over	channel	Ch.
M1.M2		is	the	concatenation	of	messages	M1	and	M2.
check(X,Y,...,Z)	in	DB	means	that	(X,Y,...,Z)	must	be	in	DB,	otherwise	the	protocol	stops.
{M}_inv(pk(A))means	that	message	M	is	encrypted	with	the	private	key	of	A
1
User
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U2SP!Request
1
2
3
B2SP?{IdTP.User.SPapp}_inv(pk(IdTP))
SPapp
1
2
Browser
3
5
1
2
IdTP
3
start
start
start
2
U2SP?Request
SP2B!Actor
SP2B?SPapp
B2IdTP!SPapp
B2IdTP?SPapp
IdTP2B!Token_SP
check(User,Cookie)	in	usersDB
3
OTPApp
O2U?SPapp
U2O!PIN1
1
2
U2O?PIN1
start
B2O?OpID.SPapp.IdTP
O2U!SPapp
O2eID!OpID.SPapp.IdTP.PIN1.PIN2
4
3
eID2O?{OpID.SPapp.IdTP}_inv(pk(eID)).CertU
O2B!{OpID.SPapp.IdTP}_inv(pk(eID)).CertU
IdTP2B?OpID.SPapp.IdTP.Cookie
B2O!OpID.SPapp.IdTP
4
O2B?{OpID.SPapp.IdTP}_inv(pk(eID)).CertU
B2IdTP!{OpID.SPapp.IdTP}_inv(pk(eID)).CertU.Cookie
1
start
O2eID?OpID.SPapp.IdTP.PIN1.PIN2
2
eID2O!{OpID.SPapp.IdTP}_inv(pk(Actor)).Certu
IdTP2B!OpID.SPapp.Actor.Cookie
B2IdTP?{OpID.SPapp.Actor}_inv(pk(eID)).CertU.Cookie
OpID:=fresh(),	Cookie:=fresh();
add(OpID,Cookie)	in	opDB
check(OpID,Cookie)	in	opDB
eIDCardU2eID!useEIDC
U2eID?useEIDC
IdTP2B?{IdTP.User.SPapp}_inv(pk(IdTP))
B2SP!{IdTP.User.SPapp}_inv(pk(IdTP))
Figure 6: Protocol View for RMCR.
5.3 Formal Specification of Assumptions
For each security assumption sa described in Section 4.4, Table 7 shows the corresponding formal specificationJsaK.
To model the TA1 and TA2CR assumptions, in our analysis we have not considered protocol runs with
the intruder i playing the role of IdTP and Browser , respectively.
To model the communication assumptions (CA1TOTP -CA3TOTP and CA1CR-CA4CR), we have used
channel properties; as the modeling of these assumptions is far from a trivial mapping, it requires an
explanation.
CA1TOTP . It is related to the inter-app communication in the mobile. The property expected by the
StartActivityForResult method can be modeled by a link property between the two channels used
in the mobile: the app that has sent a request is the same app that will receive the result.11
CA2TOTP . We have modeled the Android method, which extracts the key hash value included in the package
of an app, using an authentic channel (used by SPapp to send its identity to IDOTP) and a DB
11StartActivityForResult guarantees also that SPapp sends a request to right IDOTP app. However, as we are considering
the minimal set of assumptions that are necessary to prevent a violation of the authentication property, we have modelled
CA1TOTP only with the link property. Indeed, even if an SPapp invokes a malicious app (instead of the right IDOTP), there is
no violation of the authentication property, as the malicious app does not have the seed value needed to generate valid OTPs.
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Table 7: Mapping between Security Assumptions (Asm(s) for short) and Formal Specification.
Security Asms (sa) Formal Specification (JsaK)
TA1 We do not consider protocol runs with i playing the role of IdTP
TA2CR We do not consider protocol runs with i playing the role of Browser
CA1TOTP link(SP2IdO,IdO2SP);
CA2TOTP authentic on(SP2IdO,SPapp);
CA3TOTP confidential to(IdO2IdTP,IdTP); weakly authentic(IdO2IdTP);
weakly confidential(IdTP2IdO); authentic on(IdTP2IdO,IdTP);
link(IdO2IdTP,IdTP2IdO);
CA1CR confidential to(B2SP,SPapp);
CA2CR confidential to(B2IdTP,IdTP); weakly authentic(B2IdTP);
weakly confidential(IdTP2B); authentic on(IdTP2B,IdTP);
link(B2IdTP,IdTP2B);
CA3CR confidential to(O2B,Browser);
CA4CR confidential to(O2eID,eIDCard); weakly authentic(O2eID);
weakly confidential(eID2O); authentic on(eID2O,eIDCard);
link(O2eID,eID2O);
ActivA Data obtained during the activation phase are nonpublic values and the
communication channels used are secure
containing the relations between the SPapp identities and their key hash, used by IDOTP to read the
correct key hash value. This is due to the fact that this method — executed by the Android OS —
guarantees the authenticity of its output.
CA3TOTP . It is modeled with five channel properties (see Table 7) that all together model a TLS unilateral
channel (see [8] for more details).
CA1CR. The property expected by the redirection scheme specified in CA1CR (Android App Links) can be
modeled with a confidential channel between Browser and SPapp .
CA2CR. We have modeled CA2CR with five channel properties (see Table 7) that all together model a TLS
unilateral channel.
CA3CR. We have modeled CA3CR, which represents the launching of a browser after the OTP generation,
as a confidential channel between OTPApp and Browser .
CA4CR. The idea underlying CA4CR is that eIDCard and OTPApp establish a secure channel before the
challenge exchange of Step A9 of Fig. 4. This assumption can be modeled with five channel properties
(see Table 7) that all together model this secure channel.
Finally, to model ActivA we have set a nonpublic label to the instance factors obtained from the
activation phase.
5.4 Formal Specification of Attackers
In our analysis, we have considered the behavior of a Dolev-Yao (DY) intruder [14], who cannot break
cryptography but can overhear and modify messages using his initial knowledge and the knowledge obtained
from the traffic. This behavior is usually built-in in security protocol analysis tools (like SATMC). In
addition to the classic DY intruder, as described in Section 4.6, we have considered a set of attackers with
different capabilities able to compromise the authentication instance factors. In the following, we describe
in detail how we have formalized in ASLan++ own(IFactoro), interact(E ), interactME (E ), know(IFactork )
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and overhear(E ), where an IFactoro corresponds to a nonpublic value stored by E and an IFactork is a
nonpublic value entered by User into E . Table 8 shows this formalization, where on the JaK column there
are the properties that we have to add to the model when considering a specific attacker, on the Ja¯K column
the ones to add when an attacker is not present. For the sake of brevity we remove the universal quantifiers
related to the operations, which are reported in Table 6.
We have formally modeled the compromising of an IFactor as follows.
• know(IFactork ): we give the IFactork to the attacker as initial knowledge, i.e., we add
iknows(IFactork);
• own(IFactoro): we give the IFactoro to the attacker as initial knowledge, i.e., we add
iknows(IFactoro);
We have formally modeled the compromising of an entity as follows.
• overhear(E ): to model whether (or not) the IFactork is compromised during the protocol run we
consider (or not) the following property of the channel User2 E :
confidential to(User2 E,E);
In particular, we add the confidential channel property in case we assume the protection against this
attacker.
• interact(E ): to model whether (or not) the IFactoro is compromised during the protocol run we
consider (or not) the following property of the channel X2 E with X an honest entity:
authentic on(X2 E,X );
In particular, we add the authentic channel property in case we assume the protection against this
attacker.
• interactME (E ): to model whether (or not) the IFactoro is compromised during the protocol run in
a mutual exclusive way, we consider (or not) the following property of the channel X2 E with X an
honest entity:
weakly authentic(X2 E);
In particular, we add the weakly authentic channel property when we want to consider this attacker in
the analysis. Usually, when we are modeling a stolen entity, X is played by the User . In our reference
models, we have two physical entities that can be stolen: the smartphone and the electronic identity
card. For the latter, E is played by the card, whereas for the smartphone, as we do not have an entity
playing the device as a whole, we need to introduce a fact:
UserOwnSmartphone;
We add this fact as a pre-condition for the execution of the User ’s actions. This fact is present (meaning
it is true) if the smartphone is not stolen (and so the User will behave honestly), and must be deleted
(meaning it is false) otherwise (and so the User will not interact with any entities on the smartphone).
Finally, we have formally modeled the compromising of an OTP value as follows:
• obtain(OTP): we give to the attacker the knowledge of the OTP, i.e., we add
iknows(OTP);
at State 3 of IdTP when it is used after IdTP accepts it (see Fig. 5 and 6).
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Table 8: Formal Specification of the Attacker.
Attacker
a
Operation Formal SpecificationJa¯K (w/o attacker) JaK (with attacker)
DT Æ interactME (E ) authentic on(User2 E,User);weakly authentic(User2 E);
UserOwnSmartphone; -
DT= interactME (=) authentic on(User2=,User);weakly authentic(User2=);
SE ∨
SS
know(IFactork ) - iknows(IFactork);
AD own(IFactoro) - iknows(IFactoro);
ES overhear(E ) confidential to(User2 E,E);-
MA interact(=), authentic on(X2=,X );
with X honest entity
-
overhear(E ), confidential to(User2 E,E);-
interact(E ), authentic on(X2 E,X );
with X honest entity
-
own(IFactoro) - iknows(IFactoro);
5.5 Formal Specification of Security Goals
As described in Section 4.7 and Section 4.8, we have defined Gn and GOTP in terms of a traditional authen-
tication goal, the security assumptions and the attackers. This means that, in the formal specification, we
consider the traditional authentication goal G and we check whether it holds under the security assumptions
and the different set of attackers. The property must hold if the set of attackers is not able to compromise
all the instance factors.
G requires that a message is transmitted in an authenticated and fresh manner, thus allowing SPapp to
authenticate User and offering replay-protection at the same time. For the definition of authentication we
refer to the definition of non-injective agreement in [35]: we say that SPapp authenticates User on message
M if whenever the entity SPapp completes a run of the protocol apparently with the entity User , then
User has previously been running the protocol apparently with SPapp , and the two entities agree on M . In
addition, to ensure replay protection, we require freshness. In ASLan++, this is formalized by specifying
the goal:
(G) SP authn U on M:( ) User *->> SPapp ;
where *->> indicates authenticity, directedness (i.e., the only (honest) receiver of a message is the intended
one [8]) and freshness. In addition, following the definition in [35], associated goal labels are used to specify
which values of M the goal is referring to, namely, the Request value in State 1 of the User process (in
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6) and the corresponding value in the last state of the SPapp process (State 3 in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6). For more details about the goal channel semantics, please refer to [8].
6 Security Analysis of RMTOTP and RMCR
Our focus is determining whether the concurrent execution of protocol runs enjoys the expected security
goals in spite of the presence of one attacker or a set of attackers.
We consider model checking problems of the form:
I,M, JSAM K,AsmsA |= G (1)
where
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• I is the initial knowledge of the honest entities and the attacker (cf. Section 5.1).
• M is a state transition system modeling the behavior of the entities. In our analysis it can be either
RMTOTP or RMCR, sketched in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively.
• JSAM K: given the security assumptions {sa1, . . . , sam} of M reported in Table 7, we define JSAM K=
{Jsa1 K, . . . ,JsamK} to be the set of security assumptions that formalize them.
• AsmsA: while the behavior of the DY intruder is built-in in the tool and we thus do not explicitly
model it, we consider sets of attacker behaviors, reported in Table 8. Given a set of attacker behaviors
A = {a1, . . . , aj} ⊆TM , we define AsmsA=JDY |AK∪JDY |A¯K = {Ja1 K, . . . ,Jaj K,Ja¯j+1 K, . . . ,Ja¯7 K}, where
A¯=TM \A= {aj+1, . . . , a7}. This means that we empower a DY intruder with the properties formalized
in Ja1 K, . . . ,Jaj K, while we limit his capabilities adding the properties Ja¯j+1 K, . . . ,Ja¯7 K.
• G: the goal is always G as defined in Section 5.5. Indeed, to evaluate Gn and GOTP we change the
assumptions.
For both reference models we performed the following analyses:
Analysis on Security Assumptions: in this analysis we do not consider any attacker behavior and we remove
from the formal specification a security assumption at a time. Namely, with respect to (1) we consider
(i) A = ∅, and (ii) instead of JSAM K, each JSA′M K such that SA′M ⊂ SAM and |SA′M | = |SAM | − 1.
The goal of this analysis is to prove that all the security assumptions reported in Table 7 are necessary
to prevent a violation of the security goal G.
Analysis on Gn : given a solution involving n instance factors, to evaluate the goal Gn we consider all the
sets of attackers A among the ones listed in Table 6 such that |IFP (A)| < n.
Analysis on GOTP : to evaluate the goal GOTP , we consider sets of attackers A such that all the instance
factors apart from at least one linked with OTP are compromised and the OTP is obtained only after
its use. Namely, with respect to (1), let us call IF OTPP the set of instance factors in P linked with
OTP. We consider each A such that IFP (A) ⊇ (IFP\ IF OTPP ) and IFP (A) + IF OTPP .
Given our expertise and a positive past experience, we have selected SATMC among the available state-of-
the-art tools for the formal analysis of security protocols. The complete set of specifications and figures (in
this paper, for the sake of clarity, we represent only the significant steps of the attack traces reported by
SATMC) can be found at the companion website.12
SATMC, like all other state-of-the-art security protocol analysis tools, has some inherent limitations,
which, however, did not hinder or weaken our analyses.13 For instance, SATMC requires the user to fix
a number of parallel protocol runs. In all our analyses, we have considered several scenarios including (at
most) three parallel protocol runs in which the attacker either does not play any role or plays the role of
SPapp . Moreover, SATMC carries out an iterative deepening strategy on k. Initially k is set to 0, and then it
is incremented until an attack is found (if any) or kmax is reached. If this is the case, then no attack traces of
length up to kmax exist. The trace includes the actions performed by the attacker and the honest participants.
The length of the trace is counted by taking into account the parallel execution of non-conflicting actions
(actions executed in parallel are considered as a single step). Notice that most of the actions of the attacker
are executed in parallel (and counted as a single step) with the ones of honest participants. We set kmax to
1.5 times the length of the longest trace of the protocol when only honest entities participate. This heuristic
choice arises from past experience in security protocol analysis [4, 7] and seems to offer a good trade-off
between efficiency (i.e. keeping the time and memory consumption of the tool to a reasonable level) and
confidence that a large enough portion of the search space has been explored to detect possible attacks (i.e.
longer execution traces are unlikely to unveil attacks). In our analysis, the length of the longest trace of the
protocol when only honest entities participate is given by the total number of states for the involved entities
of Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 and corresponds to 14 and 20, respectively.
12https://stfbk.github.io/complementary/TOPS2020
13Still, as future work, it could be interesting to perform similar analyses using other tools or extensions of SATMC.
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Figure 7: Attack trace without the security assumption CA2TOTP .
Table 9: Results for RMTOTP .
Id Set of Attackers A PIN {seed} PIN token IdP
1 DT Æ (*) µ unlock unlock
2 SE ∨ SS unlock µ µ
3 AD (*) µ unlock unlock
4 ES unlock µ µ
5 DT Æ ∧ AD (*) µ unlock unlock
6 (SE ∨ SS) ∧ ES unlock µ µ
6.1 Results for RMTOTP
We give below the main details of our analyses for M =RMTOTP :
Analysis on Security Assumptions: given that the security assumptions for RMTOTP are TA1, CA1TOTP ,
CA2TOTP , CA3TOTP and ActivA, we have performed 5 executions of SATMC removing one security
assumption at a time. SATMC always finds an attack. To provide an example, Fig. 7 shows the attack
trace obtained by removing CA2TOTP . In this attack, i initiates a protocol run with idotp pretending
to be sp (indicated as i(sp)). This is permitted as the channel used is not authentic; thus, i can
pretend to be another app. Then, given the link property of the channels between i and idotp, i is
able to obtain a token SP (namely, {idtp.user.sp} inv(pk(idtp))) and impersonate the User to the
actual sp.
Analysis on Gn : Table 9 reports (concisely, by using logic operators) all the possible sets of attackers such
that up to n− 1 instance factors are explicitly compromised. In these cases, SATMC did not find any
attack, thus we can conclude that RMTOTP satisfies Gn under our assumptions. Note that MA is not
present in Table 9 as MA alone is able to compromise all the instance factors. This is possible as only
one device is used. Thus, if the device is compromised, in this case by a malicious app able to obtain
root privileged permissions, then the attacker is able to obtain a valid identity assertion and use it to
impersonate the User to an honest SPapp . However, by instructing the User to download apps from
the official store and to update the version of the operating system, the likelihood to have a malicious
app with root privilege permissions is low. Indeed, as stated in the Android Security & Privacy 2018
Year In Review [2], newer versions are “more resilient to privilege escalation attacks that previously
allowed potential harmful applications to gain persistence on devices and protect themselves against
removal attempts.” For this reason, we are confident in the practical security of the solution.
Analysis on GOTP : given that IF
OTP
RMTOTP
= {PIN ,{|seed |} PIN }, from Table 9, we can observe that the sets
of attackers (indicated with (*)) such that all the instance factors apart from at least one linked with
26
sp
pinUser
:i :sp :idtp:user :idotp
request1i(user)
keyhash
metadata
useri(user)
otp_generation(seedotp,n(CTime_1)).sp.keyhash.token_idp
{idtp.user.sp}_inv(pk(idtp))
{idtp.user.sp}_inv(pk(idtp))
Figure 8: Attack trace obtained by considering DT Æ ∧ SS .
OTP (in this case, the PIN value) are compromised are DT Æ, AD and DT Æ ∧ AD . For these sets of
attackers, SATMC does not find any attack when the OTP value is obtained after its use, thus we can
conclude that RMTOTP satisfies GOTP under our assumptions.
As expected, in the analyses on Gn and GOTP , SATMC did not find any attack. To prove that this result
in not given by the setting of restricted assumptions but by the capabilities of the attacker, we discuss two
examples where a more powerful attacker is able to compromise all the instance factors or to use the stolen
OTP before the user. In these cases, SATMC returns the expected attack traces. More specifically:
• Fig. 8 shows the attack trace obtained by considering the set DT Æ ∧ SS , that is, for example, an
attacker that watches the PIN entered by User (SS ) and then steals the smartphone (DT Æ). In the
attack, i initiates a protocol run with sp pretending to be user (indicated as i(user)). By entering
the PIN code (pinUser) when requested by idotp, i is able to impersonate the User and obtain the
requested resource (resources1).
• Fig. 9 shows the attack trace obtained by considering the set AD ∧ OE , that is, an attacker that
extracts the token IdP value from idotp and is able to intercept the OTP value before its use. In
this attack, i initiates a protocol run with sp pretending to be user (indicated as i(user)). Then,
by sending the OTP value together with the stolen token to idtp, i is able to obtain a token SP
{idtp.user.sp} inv(pk(idtp)) and use it to finalize the authentication process to the honest sp.
6.2 Results for RMCR
We give below the main details of our analyses for M =RMCR:
Analysis on Security Assumptions: given that the assumptions for RMCR are TA1, TA2CR, CA1CR, CA2CR,
CA3CR, CA3CR and ActivA, we have performed 7 executions of SATMC removing one security assump-
tion at a time. SATMC always finds an attack. Fig. 10 shows the attack trace obtained by removing
CA1CR. In this attack, i is able to obtain a token SP (namely, {idtp.user.sp} inv(pk(idtp))) and
reuse it in his smartphone. As a consequence, i is authenticated by sp as the victim (user). This
attack takes advantage of a wrong implementation of the redirection from Browser to SPapp .
Analysis on Gn : Table 10 shows all possible sets of attackers such that up to n − 1 instance factors are
compromised. In these cases, SATMC was not able to find attacks, thus we can conclude that RMCR
satisfies Gn under our assumptions. As before MA is not present in Table 10 as MA alone is able to
compromise all the instance factors.
27
request1
:i :idtp :sp
i(idotp)
otp_generation(seedotp,	n(CTime_1)).sp.keyhash.token_idp
{idtp.user.sp}_inv(pk(idtp))
{idtp.user.sp}_inv(pk(idtp))
i(idotp)
i(user)
Figure 9: Attack trace obtained by considering AD ∧ OE (before its use).
Table 10: Results for RMCR.
Id Set of Attackers PIN1 PIN2 eIDCard
1 DT Æ µ unlock µ
2 DT= µ µ unlock
3 SE ∨ SS unlock µ µ
4 AD µ unlock µ
5 ES unlock µ µ
6 DT Æ ∧ DT= µ unlock unlock
7 DT Æ ∧ (SE ∨ SS) unlock unlock µ
8 DT Æ ∧ AD µ unlock µ
9 DT Æ ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
10 DT= ∧ (SE ∨ SS) unlock µ unlock
11 DT= ∧ AD µ unlock unlock
12 DT= ∧ ES unlock µ unlock
13 (SE ∨ SS) ∧ AD unlock unlock µ
14 (SE ∨ SS) ∧ ES unlock µ µ
15 AD ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
16 DT Æ ∧ DT= ∧ AD µ unlock unlock
17 DT Æ ∧ (SE ∨ SS) ∧ AD unlock unlock µ
18 DT Æ ∧ (SE ∨ SS) ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
19 DT Æ ∧ AD ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
20 DT= ∧ (SE ∨ SS) ∧ ES unlock µ unlock
21 (SE ∨ SS) ∧ AD ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
22 DT Æ ∧ (SE ∨ SS) ∧ AD ∧ ES unlock unlock µ
Analysis on GOTP : we can observe that all the instance factors of RMCR are linked to the OTP generation
(namely, IF OTPRMCR = {PIN1 , PIN2 , eIDCard}). Thus, for all sets of attackers in Table 10 we have checked
GOTP . As a result, we have that for all these sets SATMC does not find attacks when the OTP value
is obtained after its use, thus we can conclude that RMCR satisfies GOTP under our assumptions.
As for RMTOTP , to prove that this result in not given by the setting of restricted assumptions but by
the capabilities of the attacker, we discuss an attack trace found by SAMTC in case of a powerful attacker.
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Figure 10: Attack trace without the security assumption CA1CR.
Fig. 11 shows the attack trace obtained by considering the set DT Æ ∧ DT= ∧ SS, that is, for example, an
attacker that watches the PIN1 entered by User and then steals the smartphone and the user’s eIDCard . In
the attack, i sends a request (request1) to sp pretending to be user (indicated as i(user)). By entering
the half PIN code (pin1) and using the eIDCard when requested by otpapp, i is able to impersonate the
user.
6.3 Summary
The security analyses that we have performed (summarized in Table 11) allowed us to confirm that the
security assumptions of Section 4.4 are necessary to prevent trivial attacks, and the two reference models
that we have proposed in Section 4.3 satisfy the expected authentication properties. In detail, for both
reference models, we have that:
Analysis on Security Assumptions: by removing from the formal specification only one of the security as-
sumptions at a time (indicated, for short, as “all−1” in Table 11) we have a violation of G . Given that
an attack is found whenever a single assumption is removed, we have that the JSAM K set is minimal
with respect to the analyzed scenario.
Analysis on Gn : by considering sets of attackers A among the ones listed in Table 6, SATMC does not find
any attack on the solution if up to n− 1 instance factors are explicitly compromised.
Analysis on GOTP : SATMC does not find any attack on the solution if all the instance factors apart from
at least one linked with OTP are compromised and the OTP is obtained only after its use.
These results are useful per se but also as a guideline and basis for future similar specifications and
analyses. For instance, our reference models could be adopted by designers of solutions that fall within the
requirements of our scenarios and guarantee the same security assumptions; this allows for the re-use of
the existing infrastructures (e.g., SAML-based IdPs) in the mobile context. In general, our modeling and
analysis methodology can be used directly when considering other MFA protocols or, when necessary, it can
be extended by adding other attackers or the support of the multi-factor authorization scenario.
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Figure 11: Attack trace obtained by considering DT Æ ∧ DT= ∧ SS.
Table 11: Analyses performed.
Analysis on JSAM K Attackers A Atk on
RMTOTP
Atk on
RMCR
Security Assumptions all −1 ∅ Yes Yes
Gn all A such that |IFP (A)| < n No No
GOTP all A s.t. IFP (A) ⊇ (IFP \ IFOTPP ) and
IFP (A) + IFOTPP , and iknows(OTP)
after its use
No No
7 Related Work
SSO Protocols for Native Apps. OAuth 2.0 [29] and OpenID Connect [41] have been designed for
light-RESTful API services, and are considered the de-facto standards for managing authentication and
authorization. These protocols are well-accepted in the web scenario, but they provide only partial support
for mobile apps (there is a frequent use of the expression “out of scope” in [29, 41]). This could lead
to the implementation of insecure solutions. An in-depth analysis of OAuth in the mobile environment
— underlining possible security problems and vulnerabilities — is available in [13, 48]. Given the lack of
specifications, the OAuth Working Group has released in 2017 a best practice with the title “OAuth 2.0
for Native Apps” [40]. As described in Section 4, our reference model RMCR generalizes the one proposed
in [40].
Formal Security Analysis: Web and Mobile. Although these techniques are useful for the analysis of
a specific implementation (as they are able to discover serious security flaws), it is important to perform a
comprehensive security analysis of the standard itself. In the context of web apps, Fett et al. [21] performed
a formal analysis of the OAuth protocol using an expressive web model (defined in [20]) that describes
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the interaction between browsers and servers in a real-world set-up. This formal analysis revealed two
unknown attacks on OAuth that violate the authorization and authentication properties. A similar analysis
is performed for OpenID Connect in [22]. Two other examples of formalizations of OAuth are [9], where
the different OAuth flows are modeled in the Applied Pi calculus and verified using ProVerif extended with
WebSpi (a library that models web users, apps and intruders), and [43], where OAuth is modeled in Alloy.
In our analysis (cf. Section 5) we used ASLan++ and SATMC. In the past, SATMC has revealed severe
security flaws in the SAML 2.0 protocol [39] and in the variant implemented by Google [5]; by exploiting
these flaws a dishonest service provider could impersonate a user at another service provider. Moreover,
Yan et al. [55] used ASLan++ and SATMC to analyze four security properties of OAuth: confidentiality,
authentication, authorization, and consistency.
The aforementioned formal analyses, however, focus on the web app scenario, whereas in this paper we
deal with native apps. In [57], Ye et al. used ProVerif to analyze the security of a SSO implementation
for Android. They applied their approach to the implementation of the Facebook Login and identified a
vulnerability that exploits super-user permissions.
Formal Security Analysis for MFA The literature related to formal analysis of MFA solutions is very
recent. Jacomme et al. [33] propose a threat model for MFA protocols that combines a classic Dolev-Yao
attacker with different attacker levels. The different levels are modeled as read or write access to difference
input and/or output interfaces composing the system (e.g., a key logger could be modeled as a malware with
read-only access to the USB input interface). This threat model is then formalized using the Applied pi
calculus and the ProVerif tool. There are some common choices between [33] and our analysis, such as the
modeling of an attacker capability as a property of a channel: in [33] by giving read and/or write access to a
private channel, in our case with the definition of security properties (see Section 5.3). The main difference is
the relation of the security analysis with authenticator factors, while in [33] they assume only the password
compromised, in our analysis the instance factors have a central role. As proposed in [6], we have defined a
MFA goal based on them. In [6], the authors analyzed a two-factor and two-channel authentication solution
that combines a classic single-factor solution with the exchange of a second factor using the GSM/3G/4G
communication infrastructure of the user’s mobile phone. In this work, we have generalized the definition
in [6] for any OTP generation approach and considering a solution involving n instance factors.
Among the MFA solutions on the market, YubiKey NEO [58] is one of the most attractive. It is a token
device that supports OTPs and the FIDO Alliance Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) protocol, and, by integrating
a Near Field Communication (NFC) technology, it can be used to provide a second-factor also in the mobile
context. A formal analysis of FIDO U2F was carried out by Pereira et al. in [44]. Their analysis showed that
ignoring an optional verification step of the standard could lead to an user implementation attack. RMCR
can be easily modified to support the FIDO protocol.
8 Conclusions
We have presented the design of two MFA reference models for native apps based on the requirements of
two real-world use-case scenarios (TreC mHealth and CIE 3.0 eID schemes) that include an OTP exchange
and provide a SSO experience. In addition to the protocol flow description, we have detailed the security
assumptions and defined two security goals: Gn related to a multi-factor authentication solution and GOTP
that identifies the properties of an OTP. To perform a security analysis of our reference models we have
formally modeled the flow, assumptions and goals using a formal language (ASLan++) and checked the
identified security goals using a model-checker (SATMC) in the presence of different sets of attackers.
The solution we have presented, as well as the formal specification and analysis that we have given, can
be generalized quite straightforwardly to other use cases, which we are currently doing. As future work, we
also plan to extend the analysis to other authentication factors, such as biometric traits. In addition, an
interesting future direction could be to establish a collaboration with researchers focused on vulnerability
detection of SSO and MFA protocols (e.g., [51, 54, 50, 56] for OAuth and OIDC) in order to provide a
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support for the discovery process (similarly to what has been proposed by the SPaCIoS project [52] for the
Internet of Services).
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A Abbreviations and Notations
Roles of IdM
UA User Agent
SP Service Provider
TP Token Provider
IdP Identity Provider
HWToken Hardware Token
IdTP An entity playing both the role of IdP and TP
Assumptions
sa Security assumption
TA Trust Assumption
CA Channel Assumption
ActivA Activation Assumption
Threat Model
DT Æ Smartphone Device Thief
DT= eIDCard Device Thief
SE Social Engineer
MA Malicious Application
AD App Duplicator
SS Shoulder Surfer
ES Eavesdropping Software
OE OTP Eavesdropping
TM Set of all the attackers of our threat model |TM | = 7
A= {a1, . . . , aj} ⊆ TM with
j ≤ 7
Set of attackers taken into consideration during the analysis
A¯=TM\A Set of attackers for which we add protection during the analysis
Instance Factor
IFactork Knowledge instance factor
IFactoro Ownership instance factor
IFP Set of instance factors involved in the communication protocol P (RMTOTP or RMCR)
IF OTPP Set of instance factors involved in P linked with OTP
IFP (a) Set of instance factors explicitly compromised by a in P
IFP (A) =
⋃
ak∈A IFP (ak) Set of instance factors explicitly compromised by a set of attackers A in P
Formalization
I Initial knowledge
M State transition system modeling RMTOTP or RMCRJsaK Formal specification of saJSAM K= {Jsa1 K, . . . ,JsamK} Set of security assumptions that formalizes = {Jsa1 K, . . . ,JsamK} of MJaK Formal specification of aJa¯K Formal specification of the protection to a
AsmsA=JDY |AK∪JDY |A¯K Set of assumptions that formalizes the capabilities of a DY intruder: we empower a DY intruder
with the properties formalized in JDY |AK={Ja1 K, . . . ,Jaj K}, while we limit his capabilities by
adding the properties JDY |A¯K={Ja¯j+1 K, . . . ,Ja¯7 K}.
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